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ABSTRACT
When over half a million former Imperial Japanese Army soldiers 
returned home from long captivity in Soviet labour camps in the 
late 1940s, they brought back more than their memories of hardship 
and humiliation. In post-war society, the Siberian returnees were the 
uncomfortable remnants of the failed Japanese Empire; yet it was 
their brush with the communist enemy that caused suspicion and 
dragged them into the domestic political struggles. In this article, I use 
the experiences of Siberian internees as a lens to reconsider Japan’s 
formative post-war decade, when the onset of the Cold War eclipsed 
the inconvenient legacies of empire.
An unexpected scene unfolded when Shinyō Maru, a Japanese Navy merchantman sailing 
from the Soviet harbour of Nakhodka, reached Maizuru Port on the Sea of Japan coast on 
25 July 1949.1 On board were 2,000 returnees from a long captivity in the USSR’s forced 
labour camps – some of the 600,000 former Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) servicemen 
taken away by the victorious USSR following the brief Soviet-Japanese War of August 
1945. However, to the dismay of family members and repatriation officials waiting at the 
pier, when the gangway was lowered the Shinyō Maru passengers refused to disembark.2 
They sat defiantly on the deck, the more pugnacious among them chanting songs and 
dancing up and down the ship floor, displaying a militancy rather unbecoming for sur-
vivors of what one memoirist likened to the Babylonian Captivity in the frigid Siberian 
camps.3
   1different from the ‘hellship’ Shinyō Maru, sunk by the Us Navy in september 1944 carrying over 700 allied prison-
ers-of-war, only eighty-two of whom survived. thomas saylor, Long Hard Road: American POWs during World War II (st. 
Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical society Press, 2007), p. 187.
   2‘Kyō kettei: kiso, fukiso / shinyōmaru jiken / shiberia hikiage’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 august 1949, Morning edition, 
p. 2; onda shigetaka, Shiberia yokuryū (Kōdansha, 1986), p. 277. Unless noted otherwise, all Japanese titles are published 
in tokyo. Japanese names are in the traditional order, with the surname preceding the given name.
   3takasugi ichirō, Kyokkō no kageni: shiberia furyoki (iwanami shoten, 2011), p. 359.
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Such recalcitrant behaviour of the returning ‘Siberian internees’ – what the United States 
Occupation officials called ‘nerve tactics’ – continued through the summer of 1949.4 Of the 
44 ships that arrived from Nakhodka in June–December 1949, repatriates on 33 – or 75% – 
displayed ‘rebellious behaviour’.5 Even those who did not stage sit-ins on board ships often 
maintained a ‘surly and uncooperative attitude toward repatriation officials’ and rejected 
‘the sympathetic welcome of the throng which gathered’ at Maizuru.6 Some marched off 
the ships and past their anxious families, shouting provocatively: ‘We are landing on enemy 
territory, the emperor’s islands!’7 Many performed communist songs, like the returnees on 
the Takasago Maru, who ‘in drilled harmony sang the Internationale and the International 
Youth Song, the hymn to Communist youth of the world’.8 These acts of defiance often 
sparked off clashes that reached as far as Tokyo’s Ueno Station and beyond, and on 11 
August 1949, Emperor Hirohito signed the ‘Cabinet Order No. 300 for the Maintenance 
of Order with the Repatriates,’ calling for ‘the speedy and orderly return home of ex-army 
and ex-navy personnel.’9 Reporting on the chaotic homecoming of the nation’s long-lost 
sons – for they were nearly all men – the Japanese media portrayed it almost as an invasion 
of the homeland by a Soviet-trained army eager to subvert the brittle post-war peace.10 
Some newspapers described the repatriates’ conduct ‘as a “slap in the face” to the Japanese 
people’, especially as ‘hundreds of thousands of Japanese had for months been clamoring 
for [their] repatriation’.11
The ‘red repatriates’ may have made headlines in Japanese national newspapers in 1949, 
but they would soon be largely consigned to obscurity. Their riotous arrival held the pub-
lic’s attention for months, but for decades thereafter they struggled to reintegrate into the 
changed community of post-war Japan, fighting an uphill battle for recognition and compen-
sations against successive governments. This marginality was mirrored in scholarship, too, 
conditioned in part by the Cold War, during which Soviet archives were closely guarded and 
little evidence-based research could be conducted. In Japan, the internment had to be written 
based solely on survivor memoirs, over 2,000 of which were published.12 Yet even after the 
opening of the Soviet archives in the early 1990s, while works on the topic mushroomed in 
Japanese and Russian, the ‘Siberian Internment’ (Shiberia yokuryū, 1945–1956) has received 
scarce attention in English-language scholarship.13 The internment has been analysed in 
   4General Headquarters (GHQ) of the supreme Commander for the allied Powers, Far Eastern Command (FEC), Military 
intelligence section, special report ‘Japanese Prisoners of War: life and death in soviet P.W. Camps’, 1949, Modern Japanese 
Political History Materials room, National diet library of Japan, Microfiche resource, Box 2153, File 6, section 7, p. 2.
   5Kurihara toshio, Shiberia yokuryū: mikan no higeki (iwanami shoten, 2009), p. 112.
   6GHQ FEC, ‘Japanese Prisoners of War,’ section 7, p. 1.
   7Kurihara, Shiberia yokuryū, p. 111.
   8GHQ FEC, ‘Japanese Prisoners of War,’ section 6, p. 1.
   9‘Ueno eki wa kōshiki kangeisha dake / Hikiage demukae gochūi / soren hikiage’, Asahi Shimbun, 1 July 
1949, Morning edition, p. 2; ‘dantai ōhaba ni seigen / Hikiagesha demukae’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 august 1949, 
Morning edition, p. 2; ‘Cabinet orders’, Official Gazette (English Edition), Extra No. 103, 11 august 1949, online at 
http://jalii.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/official_gazette/nag_pdf/19490811e_eb.00103.010.000_0010.0010.0_a.190100.02114900.
pdf, accessed 5 June 2016.
  10tomita takeshi, ‘shimbun hōdō ni miru shiberia yokuryū– beiso kyōchō kara reisen e, 1945–1950 nen’, Yūrashia, May 
2013, pp. 7–13; sherzod Muminov, ‘the ‘siberian internment’ and the transnational History of the Early Cold War Japan, 
1945–56’, in Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements, ed. Pedro iacobelli et al. (New 
york: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 71–95.
  11GHQ FEC, ‘Japanese Prisoners of War’, section 7, p. 1.
  12takahashi daizō, ‘‘Kaisetsu’: hangun/minshuka undō no keika’, in Horyo taikenki, Vol.8: Minshu undō hen, ed. takahashi 
daizō (soren ni okeru nihonjin horyo no seikatsu taiken o kirokusuru kai, 1992), p. 3.
  13sherzod Muminov, ‘Eleven Winters of discontent: the siberian internment and the Making of the New Japan, 1945–1956’, 
Phd dissertation, University of Cambridge, september 2015.
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the wider context of post-war repatriations of the Japanese from imperial frontiers14; the 
more recent works that view it as a discrete subject, while novel in several respects, view 
the issue largely from the vantage point of Japan.15 In short, a comprehensive examination 
of the Siberian Internment as a Cold War encounter, based on multilingual evidence, has 
been missing from Anglophone scholarship.
In this article, I view the internment as a transnational moment that demonstrates the 
impracticality of studying complex events – such as the collapse and dismantling of Japan’s 
empire and the dawn of the Cold War in East Asia – exclusively through national frame-
works and narratives. The cross-border experiences of the 600,000 Japanese caught in transit 
between eras – their peregrinations from imperial Japan to the puppet-state of Manchukuo, 
from there to the Soviet camp system and finally to a much transformed, ‘new’ Japan – 
illuminate most vividly the post-war metamorphoses in politics and society. I recount 
these experiences drawing on hitherto little used multilingual sources: Soviet, Japanese, 
and Occupation-era United States archival documents, internee memoirs, press reports, 
and records of Diet sessions.
While an important topic in its own right, the Siberian Internment is helpful in reconsid-
ering the turbulent window of 1949–1952 in Japan, when the Japanese Empire was slowly 
expunged from collective memory, overshadowed by the impending Cold War. Studying 
the period through internee experiences in ‘Siberia’ and upon repatriation provides three 
insights into Japan’s transition from wartime empire to Cold War nation-state, which I detail 
in the three sections of this article. First, the Siberian returnees’ past roles as imperial sol-
diers reappearing in post-imperial Japan bring into spotlight the omission of Japan’s empire 
from the post-war public space. Addressing this exclusion, in section “Siberian returnees 
as embodiments of Empire”, I present the Siberian Internment as a direct imperial legacy, 
and the internees themselves as the empire’s reincarnation in post-war Japan.
Second, returning home amidst the growing Cold War competition over Japan, the repat-
riates from Communist Russia witnessed a revealing transformation in domestic attitudes 
towards them: while previously seen as ‘Japanese brethren’ trapped in the brutal Soviet 
camps, they now caused alarm as a potential communist fifth column. Accordingly, the 
second section focuses on the internees’ association with the Soviet Union, the propaganda 
education to which they were subjected there, and the coincidence of their return with the 
so-called ‘Red Purge’, in which thousands of Japan Communist Party (JCP) members and 
other leftists were banished from the public sphere. I analyse this entanglement through 
the fate of Kan Sueharu, a former internee embroiled in an anti-JCP campaign in 1950.
Finally, the returnees’ post-war experiences bring into relief Japan’s remodelling as a Cold 
War United States ally, and an anti-communist, democratic nation. The Siberian repatriates 
injected into the public sphere the freshest knowledge about the USSR, which was used 
selectively by the media and propaganda in casting the Soviet Union as the ideological arch-
enemy. The returnees’ struggles to recover their agency as Japanese subjects illuminate the 
shifting boundaries of what constituted a good citizen in the ‘new’ Japan. In the last section 
  14lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard 
University asia Centre, 2009); yoshikuni igarashi, Homecomings: The Belated Return of Japan’s Lost Soldiers (New york: 
Columbia University Press, 2016).
  15andrew E. Barshay, The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945–
1956 (Berkeley, Ca: University of California Press, 2013).
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of the article, I demonstrate how for a brief moment in the 1940s–1950s, the returnees from 
the USSR contributed to re-creating, on one hand, the image of the USSR as Japan’s (and 
America’s) existential enemy and, on the other, of Japan as the America’s ally and bastion 
of anti-communism in East Asia. By contributing to the demonisation of the USSR, they 
attempted to re-create themselves as loyal Japanese subjects.
In short, by bringing back the empire into our understanding of post-imperial Japan 
and the discourses of Soviet cruelty into the increasingly anti-communist society that was 
forming, the returnees bridged Japan’s pre-war with its post-war. In the figure of the former 
internee trying to reclaim his place in the new Japan, the fallen empire met the looming 
Cold War.
Siberian returnees as embodiments of Empire
The anxiety about the return of ‘red repatriates’ to Occupied Japan reflected profound 
weariness – and wariness – of the war in a society yearning to leave the past behind.16 
This reaction, obvious though it may seem, was more complex than a momentary anxiety 
about the subversive behaviour of the Siberian returnees.17 The public’s attitude towards the 
recalcitrant repatriates reflected not only fear for the future, but also uneasiness about the 
past. It laid bare the contradictions in Japan’s post-war transition from empire to nation-
state, the disjunctions born of the hasty recalibration of the imperial realm spanning over 
7,000,000 square kilometres on land and sea to the very limited space of four Japanese 
home islands. Perhaps more challenging was the task of reducing the imperial mindset that 
had sought ‘to unite the eight corners of the world under one roof ’ to a narrowly national 
discourse of post-war Japan. This task dictated jettisoning, along with the colonies won and 
lost in a mere five decades, of the responsibility for the excesses of imperial expansion. It 
required consigning to oblivion the imperial legacies, including an army of over 600,000 
men driven away by the Soviets at empire’s fall, only to be returned to their homeland on 
the cusp of the Cold War.18 The irony in the slogan about ‘landing on the emperor’s islands’ 
was that a few years ago these very soldiers had been fighting – and dying – in the name 
of the emperor. Coming home in the middle of what Sebastian Conrad called ‘a clinical 
separation of Japan from its empire’, the Siberian returnees revived the uncomfortable 
memories of the imperial past.19
Throughout the post-war decades in Japan, the Siberian Internment has been cast, 
understandably, as a story of great injustice, a tragedy of historic proportions that shattered 
the existences of millions – the yokuryūsha, as the internees are known in Japanese, and 
their families.20 Yet despite its enduring presence in the collective memory, few voices in 
  16igarashi, Homecomings.
  17according to tony Judt, Europeans similarly ‘turned their heads resolutely away’ from the war after its 
end. Judt, ‘the ‘Problem of Evil’ in Postwar Europe’, the New york review of Books, 14 February 2008, online at: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2008/02/14/the-problem-of-evil-in-postwar-europe/, last accessed 20 June 2016.
  18sherzod Muminov, ‘Prejudice, Punishment and Propaganda: Post-imperial Japan and the soviet Versions of History and 
Justice in East asia, 1945–1956’, in The Dismantling of Japan’s Empire in East Asia: Deimperialization, Postwar Legitimation 
and Imperial Afterlife, ed. Barak Kushner and sherzod Muminov (abingdon: routledge 2017), pp. 146–164.
  19sebastian Conrad, ‘the dialectics of remembrance: Memories of Empire in Cold War Japan’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 2014, 56 (1), pp. 4–33, this quote p. 22.
  20i use the terms ‘yokuryūsha’ and ‘internee’ interchangeably to refer to Japanese captives in soviet camps. the term 
‘returnee’ refers to the internees after repatriation.
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Japan have viewed the internment as a legacy of empire. This is in agreement with the 
‘imperial erasure’ in post-war Japan, the empire’s seeming – and sudden – disappearance 
from collective memory.21 In this section, I demonstrate that this erasure was exaggerated, 
and that the imperial past repeatedly resurfaced in the Japan of the immediate post-war. 
The domestic Japanese reaction towards the Siberian returnees was illustrative in this 
regard.
Until the Soviet archives opened in the 1990s following decades of secrecy, survivor 
memoirs of Siberia served as the primary source of knowledge about the internment. These 
were tales of youth and health squandered in the frigid plains of an alien land, of an enemy 
that drove away the able-bodied Japanese against their will, turning them overnight from 
proud soldiers of a vaunted army into powerless victims of an exploitative labour-camp 
system.22 Few memoirists of the internment, however, connected their captivity in the 
USSR with their roles as imperial agents in northeast China. Even fewer of them asked 
uncomfortable questions such as the one asked by Hiraide Setsuo, an army doctor who 
spent four years in Siberia: ‘Why was the Kwantung Army stationed [in Manchuria] in 
the first place?’23 Without the imperial expansion there would be no Siberian Internment, 
but making the connection with the empire would result in drawing attention to Japan’s 
aggressive penetration into China and other Asian countries.
Nowhere is this lacuna more apparent than in the opening of many an internment mem-
oir.24 Ignoring their prehistory as imperial soldiers protecting the community of Japanese 
colonisers, many writers start their accounts by remembering how in the small hours of 9 
August 1945, Red Army troops crossed the Soviet-Manchukuo border. War-hardened in 
battles against Nazi Germany, the Soviet divisions swept through the puppet domain at an 
astonishing speed. The once vaunted Kwantung Army, stationed in northeast China to pro-
tect the empire’s frontiers and subjects, had been seriously weakened in the previous years 
as its elite divisions were transferred to the Pacific Theatre of the war, one after another. It 
was therefore hardly surprising that the Japanese military leadership was astonished by ‘the 
overpowering superiority’ of the Soviet Army, and quickly retracted south, leaving tens of 
thousands of agricultural settlers defenceless before the attackers.25 For many Japanese in 
Manchukuo, the humiliation of defeat was mixed with the anger at being abandoned to the 
enemy that killed, raped and looted its way through the Manchurian colony once hailed as 
the ‘new heaven on earth’.26
Japanese humiliation at the hands of the Soviets did not end with the brutal sacking of 
Manchukuo by the Red Army. On 23 August 1945, three days after the vanquished Kwantung 
Army agreed its surrender with the victorious Soviets, Joseph Stalin, in his capacity as the 
Chairman of the USSR’s State Defence Committee, signed a top-secret decree ‘On Receiving 
  21Conrad, ‘dialectics of remembrance’; ian Nish, ‘regaining Confidence: Japan after the loss of Empire’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 15 (1980): pp. 181–195.
  22Muminov, ‘the ‘siberian internment’’, p. 74.
  23Hiraide setsuo, Shiberia ni uzumeta karute (Bungeisha, 2000), p. 5, added emphasis.
  24For a poignant analysis of Japanese experiences on the Chinese mainland, see, for example, yoshimi yoshiaki, Grassroots 
Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People, trans. Ethan Mark (New york: Columbia University Press, 2015).
  25sejima ryūzō, Sejima Ryūzō kaisōroku: Ikusanga (sankei shimbun shuppan, 1996), pp. 277–281.
  26as quoted in louise young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley, Ca: 
University of California Press, 1999), p. 5.
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and Accommodating the Japanese Army Prisoners-of-War and Utilising Them for Labour.’27 
The decree ordered the People’s Commissariat (later Ministry) of Internal Affairs (NKVD/
MVD) to ‘select up to 500,000 Japanese … physically fit to work in the conditions of the 
Far East and Siberia,’ and to send them to the Soviet Union. The document spelled out the 
regions and projects to which this new workforce would be allocated: 150,000 Japanese 
were assigned to the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway Mainline, while another 
280,000 were dispatched to the vast expanses of Siberia and Far East. Thus, except the 
70,000 sent to Soviet Central Asia and a few thousand more to the European regions, the 
majority were destined for the expansive wilds of the Soviet East. This vast, resource-rich 
and underpopulated region, denoted by a catch-all term ‘Siberia’, was to give the captivity 
of the Japanese its name.28
Following Stalin’s order, the Red Army put the able-bodied Japanese in freight trains – 
having first reassured them they were being sent home – and transported them north across 
the Soviet-Manchukuo border along with the inanimate war booty – industrial equipment 
dismantled from formerly Japanese-owned factories, food and clothing.29 For several years, 
the Japanese worked alongside other foreign prisoners of war (POWs) and millions of Soviet 
inmates in the camps attached to various industries of the vast forced-labour economy. In 
the war-ravaged Soviet Union, badly in need of spare hands to rebuild the economy, the 
internees’ role was first of all as workforce. They were employed in coal-mining, lumbering, 
urban and railway construction, agriculture, fisheries, and other industries. They often 
found themselves in climes too frigid even for those familiar with the harsh Manchurian 
winters; at least in the first two years, they were constantly underfed, and had to perform 
physically demanding labour. In their memoirs, internees canonised these experiences as 
the ‘Siberian trinity of suffering’ – extreme cold, constant hunger, and backbreaking work. 
Of over 600,000 Japanese POWs and civilians who passed through Soviet camps, about 
10% found eternal rest in Siberia. The majority of Japanese captives were allowed to return 
home by the end of the 1940s, barring a few thousand ‘war criminals’ convicted by Soviet 
tribunals; the last group arrived at Maizuru on 26 December 1956.
In the camps, the Soviet captors put to use not only the bodies, but also the minds of the 
Japanese captives. In total isolation from the outside world for several years, the internees 
were subjected to a comprehensive re-education (for United States Occupation officials – 
‘communist indoctrination’) programme known as the ‘Democratic Movement’ (demokrat-
icheskoe dvizhenie in Russian, minshu undō in Japanese). This was a skilfully organised and 
implemented set of policies and methods that achieved impressive results, as acknowledged 
even by the United States Occupation in a 1949 Special Report.30 The soldiers who refused 
  27‘Postanovlenie GKo sssr o priiome, razmeshchenii i trudovom ispol’zovanii voennoplennykh iaponskoi armii’, 23 august 
1945, Central archive of the Ministry of defence of the russian Federation (tsaMo rF), fond (f.) 66, opis’ (op.) 178499, delo 
(d.) 1, listy (l.) 593–598.
  28While i use the phrase ‘siberian internment’ in this paper for reasons of convenience, it is not entirely accurate. the 
captivity was not confined to the geographical region of siberia, and the camps with Japanese captives were scattered across 
the Ussr. the word ‘internment’ in russian (internirovaniie) has a narrower meaning than in English: it only denotes the 
captivity of civilians as opposed to that of the ‘prisoners-of-war’ (voennoplennye).
  29‘o sozdanii komissii po vyvozu trofeinogo oborudovaniia iz Man’chzhurii’, russian state archive of socio-Political History 
(rGasPi), f. 644, op. 1, edinitsa khraneniia (ed. khr.) 459.
  30GHQ Civil intelligence section (Cis), special report ‘Japanese repatriates from soviet territory: Communist indoctrination’, 
8 March 1949, Macarthur Memorial archives, MMa-18, reel No. 13, Modern Japanese Political History Materials room, National 
diet library, tokyo.
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to disembark on the ‘emperor’s islands’, or those who upon repatriation joined the JCP’s 
struggle against American imperialism, became critical of Japan’s imperialist past thanks 
primarily to their participation in the Democratic Movement. Their instructors supplied 
them with ideas and vocabulary that made the internees conscious of their own role as past 
agents of empire. Using the methods of carrot-and-stick and ingeniously exploiting the 
grievances inherent within the military hierarchies of the former IJA, the Soviet political 
officers inculcated in their Japanese charges a critical awareness of the transgressions of their 
army and leaders. At the heart of the Democratic Movement was Nihon Shimbun (Japan 
Newspaper), edited and published in Japanese from the early days of the internment by the 
political department of the NKVD Chief Directorate for POWs and Internees (GUPVI) 
using the editorial skills of Japanese captives specially selected for the purpose.31 Along with 
the main tenets of Soviet propaganda: the cult of Stalin or the USSR’s sacrifices in freeing the 
world of Nazism and Japanese militarism, the newspaper carried critical articles on Japan’s 
past – the atrocities committed by the IJA against the Asian peoples – as well as its present – 
the ‘imperialist’ United States Occupation. Besides the newspaper, which many internees 
claimed to have used mainly for rolling cigarettes but which remained the only source of 
information in the camps, the propaganda chiefs organised rallies, reading and debate 
clubs, concerts and theatrical performances where ‘antifascist activists’ delivered speeches 
on the need to overturn the emperor system in Japan and to turn it into a ‘workers’ country’.
As early as May 1946 – only a few months into the internment – the Soviet minister 
of internal affairs Sergei Kruglov addressed a secret report to the supreme leaders of the 
state – Stalin, Molotov, Beria and Zhdanov – titled ‘On the Mood among the Japanese POWs 
Kept in the MVD Camps’, where he presented pro-Soviet statements from Japanese officers 
and ordinary soldiers. The report quoted a rally speech by one sergeant Nishimado [sic], 
who urged his fellow internees ‘To demand our freedom and achieve it now!’32 Nishimado 
had in mind the freedom from the tyranny of the officer class in the IJA. The Soviet camp 
chiefs had initially preserved this despotic army hierarchy for their own interest: it facil-
itated the task of managing over half a million Japanese captives by delegating control to 
the officers among them. Yet the Soviet leaders soon realised the benefits of exploiting the 
divide between the officer class and the rank-and-file. Pitching these two groups against 
each other and using various incentives, most effectively the promise of early repatriation, 
the captors succeeded in inducing many non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers 
to join the Democratic Movement. According to the Russian archives, over 21,000 Japanese 
internees – roughly one in 30 of the total – had participated in propaganda activities.33 In 
classes, discussions and rallies, the activists came to view their military and political leaders 
as imperialist stooges, and themselves as ‘human bullets’ of the war fought in the emperor’s 
name. Mainly as a result of these propaganda sessions, it was not so unusual for some of 
the receptive internees to interpret Japan’s empire and war in purely Leninist terms in their 
memoirs.34 Although they had been soldiers of an ‘imperial’ army, many of the Japanese 
  31rGasPi, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1053, punkt (p.) 231.
  32‘doklad ministra vnutrennikh del sssr rukovodstvu strany o nastroeniiakh sredi iaponskikh voennoplennykh…’ 17 May 
1946, GarF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 136, l. 188–191, reprinted in V.a. Gavrilov, E.l. Katasonova, Iaponskie voennoplennye v SSSR, 
1945–1956: Dokumenty (Moscow: demokratiia, 2013), hereafter Iaponskie voennoplennye, pp. 276–278.
  33Iaponskie voennoplennye, p. 274.
  34itō Masao, Mahoruka: shiberia yokuryūki (Bungeisha, 2002), p. 89.
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servicemen truly grasped the meaning of empire and their own place as imperial subjects 
only through Soviet propaganda education.
In hindsight, however, the Siberian internees’ dedication to the communist cause would 
prove largely short-lived; faced with the post-war Japanese realities, many ardent converts 
soon lost their enchantment with communism. Nevertheless, during camp years and on 
those turbulent days of landing at Maizuru, thousands still held fast to their newfound 
beliefs that had blossomed in the unlikely circumstances of forced detainment. The Soviets 
could have achieved this only through awakening a class consciousness in the soldiers who 
had for years lived under officer tyranny, and by stressing the much greater injustices com-
mitted in emperor’s name – often by these soldiers themselves. Below, I demonstrate the 
persuasive power of Soviet re-education through the example of Itagaki Tadashi, perhaps 
the unlikeliest of communist converts.
Itagaki Tadashi was the son of General Itagaki Seishirō, one of the architects of 
Manchukuo and a prominent Japanese military leader executed as Class A war criminal 
by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, or Tokyo Trial) in 1948. 
As a young officer, Itagaki Tadashi had been a staunch nationalist ready to sacrifice himself 
for the emperor – the Soviets captured him in northern Korea where he was being trained 
in a kamikaze unit. Initially, in the relatively comfortable conditions of an officers’ camp in 
Elabuga west of the Ural Mountains, Itagaki continued to harbour ultra-nationalist views, 
bullying Democratic Movement members and tearing off camp wall-newspapers put up 
by the activists. Following his transfer to a mixed (containing both officers and soldiers) 
camp in Khabarovsk, however, Itagaki underwent a ‘rebirth’, as the title of his memoir- 
article suggests.35 Interestingly, the seeds of his reawakening were sown not by the Soviet 
political officers but by his Japanese companions; Itagaki first became disillusioned with 
the decadence of his fellow officers, and then was touched by the humanity of the ordinary 
soldiers. In the Khabarovsk camp, Itagaki was awakened to the injustices inherent in the 
officer-soldier relationship and, embarrassed by this discovery, started to work alongside 
soldiers. At worksites, he also came into contact – for the first time – with ordinary Soviet 
citizens, who surprised him as warm-hearted, friendly people.
Through this quotidian experience of socialism, Itagaki’s old world view slowly crumbled 
away, giving way to a new consciousness. In early 1949, when a Soviet officer informed 
him of his father’s execution by the Tokyo Trial, Itagaki had a nervous breakdown and was 
hospitalised. It was in the camp infirmary that he got to grips with his imperial guilt; after 
days of reading and thinking, Itagaki mustered enough courage to reconsider his own war 
responsibility and to denounce his father’s role in leading Japan down the road of imperi-
alism and destruction. In April 1950, giving a testimony before the Diet Lower House soon 
after repatriation, Itagaki boldly reiterated, to the astonishment of the deputies present, his 
belief that his father had played ‘a huge role in Japan’s war of aggression’.36 Yet, despite his 
initially steadfast loyalty to the communist struggle, Itagaki’s enchantment with leftism 
proved transitory. Having joined the JCP in 1950, Itagaki left the party in 1954 and soon 
swung back to the right of the political spectrum. His oscillations came full circle in 1980, 
when he was elected to the Diet from the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which 
ruled Japan uninterruptedly between 1955 and 1993.
  35itagaki tadashi, ‘Watashi wa shiberia ni umarekawatta’, Shinsō shōsetsu, No. 18 (april 1950), pp. 22–35.
  36National diet, House of representatives, 7th Congress, special investigative Committee session 24, 12 april 1950.
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It is true that not every internee bought into Soviet propaganda so readily; many played 
along in order to earn larger rations, easier work assignments and early repatriation. It was 
perhaps true that, as in an apt metaphor by the writer Sawachi Hisae, the Siberian internees 
had become like the Japanese red-crowned cranes: only the top of their heads had actually 
turned red.37 Despite the arrogance with which the ‘red repatriates’ nailed their colours 
to the mast at Maizuru, many of those who had shown enough enthusiasm towards the 
Democratic Movement to be selected for further education in regional political schools – a 
comfortable life compared to the daily toil of their fellow internees in the camps – hardly 
ever discussed this experience after returning to Japan.
The fact that many internees were not conscious of their role as imperial agents did not 
diminish their association with Japanese Empire in the eyes of both the Soviet camp war-
dens, and more importantly the Japanese public at home. Itagaki wrote in his memoir that 
he and his fellow officers were wearing their IJA uniforms and insignia well into the third 
year of the internment, yet even without those marks of distinction they clearly were the 
embodiments of imperialism in their captors’ eyes. While spatially confined within Soviet 
borders, chronologically they were still rooted in the imperial era, unaware of the latest 
transformations in the Occupied Japan. Hence, when they returned to the Japan of the late 
1940s, the Siberian repatriates traversed not only the national and geographical boundaries, 
but also the border between two epochs in Japanese history. They re-entered the new Japan 
as remnants of the old era, of the war that had brought misery to millions, and of the army 
that had failed in its duty to protect. Moreover, on top of the disgrace of being a POW – 
the 1941 Japanese Field Army Service Code dictated: ‘You shall not undergo the shame of 
being taken alive’38 – these revenants faced the accusation of being Soviet stooges, and were 
pushed towards the society’s fringes for the best part of the post-war period. Returning to 
the Japan of the Red Purge, as I now demonstrate, the ‘red repatriates’ found themselves in 
the eye of the ideological storm.
When Empire met the Cold War
The year when the ‘red repatriates’ swept the Japanese shore, 1949, was arguably also the 
year in which the Cold War started in earnest in East Asia. The paper masks of Allied 
charity between the United States and the Soviet Union were finally thrown off, and the 
confrontation between two ideologies became prominent in people’s minds. To provide 
some context, it is worth remembering that in this watershed year a triple blow was dealt 
to United States influence in East Asia: in January, the JCP achieved its highest ever result 
in the Diet elections, winning 35 seats and almost 3,000,000 votes, in August the Soviet 
Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb, and in October the triumphant Mao Zedong 
proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Re-entering Japan in this 
stormy period, the Siberian returnees were sucked into the vortex of domestic confronta-
tion on the Soviet influence in Japan. They occupied a central place in the debates about 
Japan’s uncomfortable past and uncertain future. In the process, the repatriates from Siberia 
  37sawachi Hisae and sataka Makoto, ‘sedai o koete kataritsugitai sensō bungaku’, Sekai, No 6, 2007, pp. 206–214, this 
quote p. 207.
  38Clifford Kinvig, ‘allied PoWs and the Burma-thailand railway’, in Japanese Prisoners of War, ed. Philip towle, Margaret 
Kosuge and yoichi Kibata (london: Hambledon and london, 2000), pp. 37–57, this quote p. 48.
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became the Cold War’s first victims in Japan, as I show through the story of the death of 
Kan Sueharu, a former camp interpreter.
The initial signs of the coming ideological clashes were already evident in the Soviet 
camps, where the Japanese were divided according to not only class, but also ideology. On 
the opposite side of the spectrum from the ‘red repatriates’ were the Japanese captives who 
had managed to hold on to their nationalism and loyalty to the emperor even in the Soviet 
camps. These nationalist internees had been a nuisance for the Soviets, organising sabotage 
campaigns and refusing to work for their captors. They had also been patiently waiting for 
the day when the Democratic Movement activists would lose the protection of their Soviet 
masters; as soon as the repatriation ships departed Nakhodka, the ‘red repatriates’ were 
often violently beaten and even thrown overboard.39
The confrontations were hardly limited to the sea passage; the most prominent nationalist 
group among repatriates, ‘The Rising Sun Brigade’ (Hinomaru Teidan), instigated one of the 
early ideological entanglements in post-war Japan. The affair originated from an accusation 
that Tokuda Kyūchi, the JCP secretary-general, had ‘demanded’ in a letter to his Soviet 
partners that they repatriate from Siberia only the ‘true democrats’, and to postpone the 
return of the ‘reactionaries’.40 In a call reported by the Asahi, Kubota Zenzō, the leader of 
the Rising Sun Brigade (Hinomaru Teidan), urged the authorities to investigate Tokuda.41 
Ten days later, Kubota testified in a Diet Upper House session, where he read out a petition 
signed by 373 fellow members of the Rising Sun Brigade accusing Tokuda of obstructing the 
repatriation of the fellow Japanese considered ‘reactionaries’ by the JCP.42 This was a grave 
accusation against the Japanese communists, as at the time the issue of repatriation was 
an explosive topic. ‘Special Committees on Repatriation’ were set up in both Diet houses, 
where extensive hearings were held in February–April 1950. With hindsight, it is possible 
to see that the issue became the culmination of the Red Purge of leftists and communists 
from the public sphere, and thus had significant implications for Japan’s entanglement in 
the Cold War confrontation.
Besides Tokuda, who denied all allegations before the deputies in his trademark mil-
itant manner, I analyse the tragic personage of Kan Sueharu, who took his own life after 
his second Diet testimony. A philosopher and humanist who had learned Russian in the 
camps, Kan had translated to his fellow Japanese at Karaganda Camp the speech by the 
political officer Senior Captain Yermolaev, who had alluded to Tokuda’s alleged ‘demand’ 
when answering the internees’ question about repatriation. When witnesses mentioned his 
name during a Diet Upper House session in March 1950, Kan was in the audience; he stood 
up and identified himself. He was summoned as a witness two days later. This was the first 
of his two hearings; after his brief self-introduction, one committee member after another 
grilled him about that day in Karaganda Camp in September 1949. Answering questions, 
Kan recited from memory, in Russian, Yermolaev’s original answer, and translated it for the 
benefit of the audience. The discussion then turned into a lesson in polemics about shades 
  39Fujimori takayuki, ‘aishū no tōdo’, in Heiwa no ishizue: shiberia kyōsei yokuryūsha ga kataritsugu rōku (Heiwa kinen 
jigyō tokubetsu kikin, 1991–2012), Vol. 9, pp. 190–204, this quote p. 202.
  40tomita takeshi, Shiberia yokuryūshatachi no sengo: reisenka no yoron to undō, 1945–56 nen (Jinbun shoin, 2013), 
pp. 101–112; Barshay, The Gods Left First, Chapter 3, ‘Knowledge Painfully acquired: takasugi ichirō and the ‘democratic 
Movement’ in siberia’, pp. 81–120.
  41‘‘tokuda shi o tsuikyū’ – soren hikiage no Kubota shi kataru’, Asahi Shimbun, 13 February 1950, p. 2.
  42National diet House of Councillors, special Committee on the issue of repatriation of Japanese Nationals overseas, 
7th congress, 13th session, 23 February 1950.
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of meaning and nuances of interpretation. Yermolaev had used the word nadeetsia (‘hopes’) 
in reference to Tokuda’s wish; Kan used the verb ‘expects’ (kitai suru) in his translation. The 
Russian word nadeetsia has shades of meaning, but it expresses more a passive hope than 
an active wish; translating it as ‘demands’ would be stretching the word’s meaning. Still, the 
interrogators wanted to know whether Tokuda had really made this demand. Kan answered 
that he did not know: ‘I was there and then only in the capacity of an interpreter,’ he said. 
Committee members pressed Kan to express his ‘impression’ of whether Yermolaev had 
meant ‘demands’ or ‘expects’; Kan held on to the word ‘expects’, and remained confident in 
the accuracy of his memory, which was repeatedly called into question.43
Kan’s interrogators kept bringing up evidence that would, in their view, implicate him in 
being a communist and a JCP-sympathiser. Besides questioning the linguistic acrobatics of 
the Soviet camp officer’s speech, they talked pointedly and repeatedly about Kan’s role as a 
Democratic Movement activist, and his opposition to the emperor system in Japan.44 Kan 
countered by saying that all translators and other administrative staff were automatically 
classified as ‘activists,’ for camp authorities had to meet minimum targets in activist numbers. 
Even when interrogators quoted other testimonies that went against Kan’s, the witness was 
apparently confident of his innocence and in the belief that truth would prevail no matter 
what, and willingly cooperated with the deputies. Committee members did not fail to take 
advantage of this cooperation, probably seeing it as a sign of a guilty conscience. During 
his second testimony, this time in the Lower House, the grilling Kan had to endure turned 
into an attack from several fronts.45 The day following the hearing, the 32-year old Kan left 
a note lamenting his ‘weakness to take on the evil and falsehood’ of the world and threw 
himself under a Chūō Line train near the western Tokyo suburb of Kichijōji.46
Newspapers portrayed Kan’s suicide as an outcome of depression and mental fatigue, 
and in the eyes of the newspaper-reading general public Kan acquired the aura of a strange, 
mentally unstable person.47 In hindsight, it must have seemed plausible to newspaper read-
ers that he had taken his own life in order to escape justice.48 To the proponents of anti- 
communist crackdowns, Kan’s death provided the missing link in the conspiracy theory 
connecting the Siberian internees with the JCP, as enemies within ready to destabilise the 
country on Soviet orders. Through the issue around Tokuda’s ‘demand’, the Siberian return-
ees became scapegoats used to whip up indignation towards the USSR and its Japanese 
‘stooges’, and to excise the objectionable groups from the body politic. In this sense, Kan’s was 
the first of many ‘sacrifices’ that had to be made to restore the ‘social fabric’ of post-war Japan 
in opposition to the communist Soviet Union49. This was evident in the attempts to label this 
  43National diet House of Councillors, special Committee on the issue of repatriation of Japanese Nationals overseas, 
7th cong., 16th session, 18 March 1950.
  44on Kan’s opposition to the emperor system, see tada shigeharu, Uchinaru shiberia yokuryū taiken: Ishihara Yoshirō, 
Kano Buichi, Kan Sueharu no sengoshi (shakaishisōsha, 1994), pp. 26–27.
  45ibid. see also odagiri tadashi, ‘Kan sueharu: ‘Bungeiteki shinrigaku e no kokoromi’ josetsu (sono 7)’, Hokkaido University 
of Education - Jōsho shōgai kyōiku kenkyū kiyō 20 (2001).
  46‘Jibun no yowasa ni zetsubō shite shinu/isho rokutsū hakken / tokuda yōsei shōnin jisatsu’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 april 
1950, Evening edition, p. 2; ‘Kan shōnin naze jisatsu shita ka/tokuda yōsei shōnin jisatsu’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 april 1950, 
Morning edition, p. 3.
  47‘Karō ga gen'in/Hōjin hikiage bōgai mondai/tokuda yōsei shōnin jisatsu’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 april 1950, Morning 
edition, p. 3.
  48Nakano shigeharu was a rare exception; he was present at Kan’s testimony and felt guilty he had not warned Kan of 
what awaited him at the hearing. Nakano, ‘Kōsei no yūwaku’, quoted in tada, Uchinaru shiberia, p. 24.
  49Jenny Edkins’ Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 99–110) provides 
an interesting analysis of political sacrifice.
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sensitive man a ‘red’, despite the fact that Kan did not consider himself a communist, only 
someone who had tried to do a good job as an interpreter. These nuances would be lost in 
the frenzy of the Red Purge Japan, where even momentary association with communism 
could attract suspicion. This wariness was manifest in the fact that some members of the 
Diet special committee interpreted Kan’s mental strain as arising not from his cornering in 
the Diet, but from the insecurity of a Soviet spy afraid of being found out. Four days after 
Kan’s suicide, committee member Kimura Kōhei requested a separate investigation into this 
version, asking to summon to testify in the Diet those who accused Kan of being a spy.50
On 30 April 1950, the Diet Lower House ruled that the JCP, and Tokuda personally, 
had obstructed the repatriation of Japanese from the USSR. A few days later, on the third 
anniversary of the Japanese Constitution on 3 May 1950, the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur publicised a statement titled ‘The Other 
Minority’. The minority he had in mind was the JCP and its followers, who he accused of 
abusing the rights granted to them by the post-war Constitution. MacArthur stated this 
in no uncertain terms: ‘Under foreign dictation to establish a domestic basis favorable to 
the ultimate subjugation of Japan to the political control of others’, this minority sought 
‘to encompass freedom’s destruction … through the perversive use of liberty and privilege’ 
and by ‘the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda intended to mislead 
and coerce the public mind’.51
MacArthur’s statement, reflecting the spirit of the times when leftists came under increas-
ing pressure, was a portent of the impending clash on the Korean Peninsula. On 30 May, 
days after MacArthur’s statement and four weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, 
some leftist demonstrators in Tokyo resorted to violence against United States citizens at 
American Memorial Day celebrations, following which JCP leaders were all purged ‘from 
public service’.52 This became the hardest blow to the party’s activities in Japan and it led to 
the exile of top party officials, including Tokuda, and the arrests of others.53
Witnesses of the enemy: the Soviet Union in returnee testimonies
In her book on Cold War captives, defectors, refugees, and the propaganda wars that raged 
around them, historian Susan Carruthers shows how during the late 1940s the Soviet Union 
became associated with slavery in the eyes of the American public. In the anti- communist 
frenzy that engulfed the United States public opinion, the Soviet labour camps, while 
‘evok[ing] some of the most repugnant features of the Third Reich’, were seen as worse 
than even the Nazi extermination camps. According to this view, even ancient slave-owners 
were better than Gulag chiefs, who kept ‘an entire population in a condition of terror, mute 
in the face of state tyranny’.54
  50National diet House of Councillors, special Committee on the issue of repatriation of Japanese Nationals overseas, 
7th cong., 23rd session, 10 april 1950.
  51douglas Macarthur, ‘the other Minority’, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur, ed. Major Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New york: Frederick a. Praeger, 1965), pp. 204–209.
  52John dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (london: Penguin, 2000), p. 272.
  53robert a. scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley, Ca: University of California Press, 
1967), Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 48–96.
  54susan l. Carruthers, Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2009), pp. 123–124.
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While the United States propagandists made good use of stories told by the German 
returnees from the Soviet camps and defectors who had slipped through the Iron Curtain, 
Japan had its own characters to play in the ideological standoff. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
slavery narratives took hold in Japan too, mirroring the discourses in the United States. 
Regardless of their original motives, once the memoirists made their stories public, their 
testaments started a life of their own. Through them, words such as ‘forced labour’ (kyōsei 
rōdō), ‘slave’ (dorei) and ‘violent revolution’ (bōryoku kakumei) became buzzwords in writing 
about the Soviet Union in Japan.
Despite their travails as labourers in the Soviet camps and suspected communists upon 
return home, in spite of the niche of victimhood they carved out for themselves in post-war 
Japan, the Siberian returnees’ role in the political struggles for Japan’s future should not be 
defined solely through their victimhood. They were not mere instruments of manipulation 
in the hands of different political actors – they were also political actors in their own right. 
The returnees engaged in the political battles by forming associations and, indirectly, by 
trying to influence the debate through their testimonies about Siberia. While the former 
efforts proved largely unsuccessful, the latter method had three important outcomes.
First, the recollections published by the returnees from the Soviet Union were an act of 
making peace with the past and their responsibility in it, an attempt to explain and confront 
the suspicion and discrimination they faced in the society by telling their own versions of 
the truth. And while memoirists had diverse reasons to put pen to paper, the urge towards 
reinstating themselves as ‘normal’ and loyal Japanese citizens was perhaps the greatest moti-
vation. In the society where they struggled to find jobs and marriage partners, many felt 
the need to retell their experiences to avoid being misunderstood, and to seek compassion 
that would lift them to the moral high ground of victimhood. Partly through memoirs, the 
yokuryūsha could externalise the shame and responsibility for the cruelty of and failure in 
war, and the shameful captivity in enemy hands.
Second, many of the memories returnees brought back became a tributary to the stream 
of victim narratives that took hold in post-war Japan.55 Prioritising Japanese victimhood in 
circumstances where suffering was widespread, they created a lopsided ‘literature of hard-
ship’. Analysing these accounts against the background of the Soviet archival documents 
demonstrates that while the internment was an illegal and inhumane confinement that made 
a mockery of international agreements, the experiences of Japanese captives were hardly 
unique within the larger context of the Soviet forced labour camps. Focusing mainly on 
Japanese suffering, camp memoirs rarely put these hardships into perspective. There were, 
of course, memoirs that touched on the broader context of the Soviet forced labour camps 
and the suffering of other detainees, but the majority was oblivious to such nuances.
Finally, and more importantly, internment narratives became the perfect raw material in 
writing about the Soviet enemy. They helped popularise the image of the cold, hungry and 
backward USSR in Cold War Japan; the fact that this benighted nation had helped defeat 
Japan’s militarist empire was hardly mentioned. The experience of living in the USSR, often 
working shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet people, made the Siberian captives valuable 
‘witnesses of the enemy’ who had the freshest, most direct knowledge of the conditions in the 
  55For example, James Joseph orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).
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communist superpower. Besides writing memoirs, some of them testified in the Diet, gave 
lectures, painted Siberia from memory, thus producing ample material for representations 
of the USSR in Japan. These accounts came in handy for a variety of people and groups, but 
their most important contribution was to the Cold War discourses in Japan.
National newspapers, at the time second only to radio as sources of information, played 
a leading role in popularising mainstream narratives and in rallying support for Occupation 
policies.56 They kept the public informed on debates between Soviet and American dele-
gates on the internees and their repatriation at various venues. With the hardening of the 
United States stance towards the USSR in 1948–1949, negative reports about the USSR 
and its camps became more frequent in Japanese newspapers, especially on the Soviets’ 
reluctance to repatriate the internees. Reporting on the debate in Washington between 
the Soviet and American officials in the Far Eastern Commission, the Yomiuri newspaper 
quoted the American side: ‘Although two years have passed since the end of the war, the 
Soviet Union continues to use [Japanese captives as] “slave labour”’.57 In a report on 27 April 
1949, the Asahi newspaper outlined the questions asked by the United States representative, 
William J. Sebald, to his Soviet counterpart, Kuz’ma Derevianko, at a meeting of the Allied 
Council for Japan. In what had become usual practice, Sebald urged the Soviets to provide 
information on the numbers and names of Japanese internees, reminding Derevianko of 
obligations set in Japan’s surrender documents and the Potsdam Declaration, and the gravity 
of the issue for the Japanese. Proving the last point, the newspaper quoted a statement by 
Diet Lower House members, who described the internment as ‘an issue we [the Japanese] 
cannot forget for even a single day’.58
The Soviet Union’s uncooperative attitude worked to its detriment, giving rise to specula-
tions and more accusations. On 24 July 1949, the Yomiuri published a front page article with 
a catchy headline: ‘Ten Million Forced Labourers in the USSR: the British Representative at 
the UN Demands an Inquiry into the Camps.’59 In a March 1951 article that reflected the 
fear of communism in the West, the London Daily Telegraph reported that ‘a Communist-
indoctrinated Japanese corps [was] with the Russians on Sakhalin Island … [possibly] 
formed from among the 300,000 Japanese prisoners for whom Russia has not accounted.’ 
Archives show that the British diplomats dismissed the story as ‘rather far-fetched’, but it 
nevertheless conveyed the spirit of the times.60 The shroud of secrecy surrounding Soviet 
intentions gave birth to speculations of this kind, and helped foster and maintain a sinister 
image of a slavery kingdom firmly attached to discourses on the USSR.
Slavery narratives were promoted not only by the United States congressmen and con-
servative journalists. Former internees called themselves slaves as long as their suffering 
remained unacknowledged and unpaid for. They directed their anger towards not only 
the USSR, but also the successive Japanese cabinets who disregarded their demands for 
  56on the role of newspapers in society, see, the asahi shimbun Company, Media, Propaganda and Politics in 20th-Cen-
tury Japan, trans. Barak Kushner (london: Bloomsbury, 2015).
  57‘soren horyo mondai de ronsō’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 February 1948, Morning edition, p. 1.
  58‘Kazoku ga matte iru yokuryūsha no jōhō – seborudo kōshi soren daihyō ni yōkyū’, Asahi Shimbun, 27 april 1949, p. 2.
  59‘senman nin o kyōsei rōdō: Ei kokuren daihyō shūyōjo chōsa o yōkyū’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 July 1949, p. 1.
  60the National archives of the UK, Fo 371/92602, pp. 4–10. tomita takeshi explained the discrepancy in internee numbers 
through a difference in interpretation: the soviets counted only the captives in the Ussr, whereas Us officials included pris-
oners in all 'soviet-controlled territories'. the difference of about 300,000 people was then exploited in news and propaganda 
reports. tomita, ‘shimbun hōdō’.
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compensation. Hiratsuka Mitsuo, a yokuryūsha and a prominent activist, thus explained 
the internees’ struggle for compensations and recognition in post-war Japan: ‘We are doing 
it to claim back our dignity as human beings. Only slaves are put to work without being 
paid. We cannot die as slaves.’61 In other words, slavery narratives became the linchpin for 
stories of not only Soviet brutality, but also the Japanese government’s neglect. Importantly, 
uttered by the witnesses who had seen and experienced it all, these testaments to the brutish 
nature of the Soviet regime became grist to the propaganda mill in early Cold War Japan.
In perhaps the most extensive Japanese collection of internment memoirs – the 19 vol-
umes on Siberia in the Heiwa no ishizue (Cornerstone for Peace) series – recollections that 
casually use the word ‘slave’ in describing the everyday lifestyle of the Japanese internees are 
fairly common. Remembering decades later his time in the Soviet camps, memoirist Tōjō 
Heihachirō talked about ‘the slave-like existence in the Siberian camps’.62 Amaya Konokichi, 
who penned a book-long memoir of his Siberian years, poignantly wrote in Heiwa no ishizue 
about being left by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria only to be led to ‘endless months of 
slavery in Siberia’.63 Takeyasu Kumaichi’s account was the most vitriolic, recounting one of 
the harshest examples of Soviet mistreatment of the Japanese. The little finger on Takeyasu’s 
left hand was frostbitten after working outside in the temperatures of –50 °C.64 The finger 
turned white and Takeyasu lost all sensation in it. Although this was not unseen in the 
frigid Siberian climes, what happened in the camp infirmary infuriated Takeyasu so much 
he remembered it for decades. The female camp doctor first cut off his finger with scissors 
and a saw, then added, ‘Your left hand is useless but you have your right hand. You can get 
back to work.’ Takeyasu wrote, There was no mercy in her voice, no sign that she felt sorry 
for me. So was this our fate, of those who lost the war? We were nothing but slaves. Was 
this how a slave was supposed to be like?65
These narratives of the Soviet Union as a brutal camp empire were drawn from bitter 
experiences of the survivors, but they had a powerful double-effect of demonising the USSR 
and portraying the Siberian Internees exclusively as victims. In the war of two ideologies 
any means were justified, but few accusations undermined Soviet prestige as effectively 
as the reputation of a slave-labour state. Soviet archives demonstrate the sensitivity of the 
country’s leadership to international opinion about the USSR.66 As a state born of a pro-
letarian revolution, the Soviet Union’s historical mission was ‘to prepare the ground for 
other revolutions to come’.67 As a self-proclaimed worker’s state founded to end capitalist 
exploitation, the Soviet Union was vulnerable to accusations that it forcefully exploited 
the labour of millions. Accusations of slavery were perhaps the most effective form of 
demonising the USSR.
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Soviet archival documents demonstrate that Japanese victim narratives about life in the 
camps paint a one-sided picture of the Siberian Internment. Without denying the cruel and 
illegal nature of the internment, it is possible to glimpse in these documents the USSR’s plans 
and intentions in relation to the Japanese and other Axis POWs, as well as the more practical 
issues of day-to-day running of the labour camps. This knowledge helps question the so far 
unquestioned truths about Japanese analyses of the internment, and complement the existing 
scholarship in English. To provide but one example, Soviet archives raise doubts about the 
argument that the Japanese – or other foreign POWs and internees for that matter – were 
the ‘men Stalin didn’t care about’.68 Russian sources reveal that, for all his well-documented 
disregard for human life and dignity, Joseph Stalin did care for the foreigners more than the 
Soviet prisoners in the Gulag, as we learn from the orders he issued at the time, albeit not 
out of humanist considerations. To the contrary, as a pragmatic politician, Stalin cared for 
the foreign captives for very practical reasons. Not only were the foreign POWs valuable 
manpower in rebuilding the Soviet economy; the death of every captive damaged the Soviet 
Union’s image on the international scene that Stalin carefully cultivated during the post-war.
Viewed in the larger context of the Soviet camp system for foreign POWs, the blatant 
imprisonment of over half a million Japanese citizens was not simply a Japanese tragedy, 
but a nexus in the chain of forced migrations, population exchanges, deportations of whole 
ethnic groups or former soldiers initiated by Joseph Stalin across the vast spaces of the 
Eurasian continent following the end of WWII. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to 
say that for all the Japanese-centred nature of internee memoirs, the Japanese captives were 
something of an afterthought for the Soviet camp authorities, the last – and least expected – 
batch of inhabitants to enter the POW camps.
Moreover, not all Japanese internees returned damning verdicts on their captivity. Camp 
experiences were diverse and depended on the internee’s rank, the camp officials at whose 
mercy he lived and worked, and the geographical region where he was interned. Even 
amidst all the suffering, some of the memoirists remembered lenience and, at times, kind-
ness shown by the Soviets. Yawatagaki Masao, who spent four years and eight months in 
Siberia, remembered that even when the Soviet officers were furious, they would never 
beat the Japanese, only shout. He was moved by the words of an elderly Russian man who 
thus opined on the treatment of the Japanese: ‘We cannot treat you as slaves. You might be 
POWs, but first of all you are human beings.’69 Despite the overwhelming majority of nega-
tive recollections, there were memoirists – for example Takasugi Ichirō with his bestselling 
In the Shadow of the Northern Lights – who found humanity in the unlikely circumstances 
of the Soviet camps by casting away the shackles of ideology and building bonds with the 
ordinary Soviet people.
Conclusion
In the Cold War project of rebuilding Japan in America’s image, the Japanese returnees 
from the Soviet camps played an important, if overlooked role. Caught by the Red Army 
in the Manchurian plains – where their government had sent them years earlier to ease the 
burden on the domestic economy and to build a new, model colony – they endured one 
  68Barshay, The Gods Left First, pp. 165–188.
  69yawatagaki Masao, 'Watashi no seishun ki', in Heiwa no ishizue: shiberia, Vol. 2, p. 28.
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circle of hell after another, and those who survived in the end came back to a nation averse 
to what they represented: imperial past, ignominious defeat, and the communist enemy.
Indeed, the returnees from ‘Siberia’ stood for many things at once. To begin with, they 
were victimisers – many among them were conscious of the unfair treatment they had 
extended to the Chinese and Manchu peasants upon arrival from Japan in the 1930s. They 
were also victims – arguably more so than many other Japanese – of two empires, Japanese 
and Soviet (and possibly the third, American). They were war veterans who had suffered 
their way through war and internment; hence the message of Gokurōsama! (‘Thank you 
for enduring the hardships!’) with which the crowds greeted them at the Maizuru Port 
upon return home. Yet they were also POWs – a shameful label in the IJA, where being 
caught alive was a sign of cowardice and insufficient loyalty to the emperor. Finally, their 
belonging to Japan was far from indubitable because of the widespread belief that many of 
them were now communists, brainwashed and converted by their Soviet captors in camp 
indoctrination sessions.
Inhabiting the grey areas of post-war society, the returnees from the USSR rarely came 
into the limelight because of their Siberian past. Their association with the Soviet Union 
haunted even those among them who became household names in Japan – for example, 
the business strategist Sejima Ryūzō, or the author and translator Takasugi Ichirō. For dec-
ades during the Cold War, their efforts to leave the past behind, to achieve recognition and 
peace of mind bore little result. Their lives remained framed by Cold War discourses until 
the Cold War itself ended; in other words, they were not only the Cold War’s first victims, 
but also among its last ones.
In June 2010, 65 years after the start of the internment, the internees’ decade-long struggle 
for compensation finally bore fruit when the Diet adopted the ‘Postwar Forced Internees 
Special Law’ promising ‘consolation payments’ in acknowledgement of the ‘hardships 
endured by the postwar internees during the forced internment’.70 Yet the irony is that 
only after the Soviet Union’s demise, thousands of returnees who faced discrimination and 
suspicion because of their association with the USSR since the 1950s suddenly acquired in 
the Japanese collective mind the cloak of victimhood. As the need to demonise the USSR 
disappeared with the Soviet juggernaut’s collapse and Cold War’s end, the victimhood of its 
one-time captives was raised onto a nation-wide pedestal in Japan. The ‘Special Law’ was 
undoubtedly a victory, albeit a very conditional and truncated one. It is a pity that many of 
the former Siberian Internees did not live to witness it.
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